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Abstract
We study social behaviour of agents on capital markets when these are per-
turbed by small perturbations. We use the mean field method. Social behaviour
of agents on capital markets is described: volatility of the market, aversion con-
stant and equilibrium states are discussed. Relaxation behaviour of agents on
the capital market is studied. Equation of motion for the agent average num-
ber is of the relaxation type. Development of the group of agents in the states
corresponding to minimum of the aim function is either linear either exponen-
tially damped. There exist characteristic volatility constants Vc3 and Vc3. The
constant b of verification of information contribution to the aversion constant A
and the A0 constant of aversion are distinguishing three types of dependencies
of the minimum of the aim function on the expected volatility EV and on the
expected returns E. Arbitrage trades and group forces lead the group into the
equilibrium state. Verification of information intensity influences return back
to the equilibrium state. The linear in time damping to the equilibrium state
is characterized with the characteristic time T3 and T6, the exponential with
a characteristic time τ . Their dependence on the expected volatility, on the
expected profit and characteristics of agents is discussed.
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1 Introduction
The group of agents on the capital market is characterized as a social group, [1]
- [6]. We study information which is private [7], there is present an information
asymmetry. Unverifiability is a special kind of information problem [7]. Then
there exist subgroups of interacting agents on the capital market the interac-
tion of which has the following property: they are nonreducibile [5]. Nonre-
ducibile subgroups form cells. Configuration of interactions between agents in
the group forms a macroscopic structure. The statistical equilibrium due to mi-
croreversibility is characterized by the maximum of entropy and by the minimum
of energy (costs of information exchange minus a return). In [5] we used meth-
ods of statistical physics to study social behaviour of agents. Three observed
dependencies of personal radius of an agent on other characteristics enabled us
to characterize the quantities of cells, faces (nonreducibile subgroups), vertices
(agents) and bonds (interactions) [2]. There exist constrains in this structure, a
fixed number V of agents in the group present, a number E of interactions within
the group is constant, a number F of subgroups which are nonreducibile (faces)
is constant, and a number C of cells is constant for a given conditions as con-
cerning the expected return and expected risk. This structure is equivalent to
random cellular networks. Such networks and their evolution were studied in [3]
and [4]. Random cellular networks describe structure in the group of agents in
some approximation, this approximation is expected to be sufficient to described
main characteristics of the group as concerning the exchange of the information.
The capital market and social behaviour of agents was studied recently, [6]. The
quantity which characterizes verification of information contributes to aversion
of agent with respect to a risk. The mix of investments of an agent in a given cell
with an average measure A of risk aversion in the cell is found from extremes of
the function FM, the aim function. We have found the minimum of the average
(per cell) function < FM >. An absolute minimum corresponds to such a state
in which there is an optimal mix. The number of nonreducible subgroups F per
cell < f > contributes linearly to aversion constant A, (A = A0+(< f > −4).b).
The larger quantity which characterizes verification of information, the larger
expected profit is and the larger accepted expected risk is. We have formulated
model describing behaviour of agents on the capital market [6]. A pyramidal
(hierarchical) structure appears in the group for < f >= 4. In this case the
aversion constant is A = A0, which corresponds to hierarchical economy sys-
tems. Better verification of information leads to expectation of higher returns
and thus the acceptable risk is larger. A total averse constant A is increasing
with verification of information and market-based economy system is present in
larger extend. We have found that there exists co-existence of both economy
systems in real economy. In our model the market-based system corresponds to
a state with < n >= 6 and the hierarchy-based to < n >= 3. We assumed that
in our model the individual investors and agents from financial intermediary
firms do not differ.
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The aim of this paper is to study social behaviour of agents on capital
markets when these are perturbed. We study small perturbations of the market
using mean field method. Social behaviour of agents on capital markets is
described firstly. Model and results of its study, which were done recently by
the author [5] and [6] for this behaviour are shortly discussed for reference
purposes. Volatility of the market, aversion constant and equilibrium states
are discussed then in the next section. Relaxation behaviour of agents on the
capital market in the fourth section is studied. Equation of motion for the agent
average number is of the relaxational type, and is described in the next section.
Development of the group of agents in the states corresponding to minimum
of the aim function is linear and exponentially damped for the case when the
extreme of the aim function (which is found from the first derivative of the aim
function equal to zero) is minimum and when it is maximum. This development
is studied in the sixth section. Conclusions are in the last section.
The main results of the paper are the following. There exist characteristic
volatility constants Vc3 and Vc3. The constant b of verification of information
contribution to the risk constant A and the A0 constant of aversion are distin-
guishing three types of dependencies of the minimum of the aim function on
the expected volatility EV and on the expected return E. These are A0 > 4b,
2b < A0 < 4b and A0 < 2b. The minimum in 3 << n >< 6. in < n >= 3 and in
< n >= 6 is found. We assumed in this paper that profits are positive. The law
of one price is violated by arbitrage opportunities. Arbitrage trades and group
forces lead the group into the equilibrium state. The other groups interacting
with the group of agents on the capital market are not studied here directly.
This group consists of nonreducibile subgroups [6]. Nonreducibile subgroups
are also groups with their properties. Real markets contain many agents acting
on them. We will assume that there is a large number of agents in the group
of agents on the capital market. In the group of agents on the capital market
there are formal groups and informal groups allianced in response to the need
for social contact concerning the capital market. Thus interactions of agents
described by topology are interactions of agents in formal and informal groups.
On the capital market such groups as its subgroups are forming. We mentioned
nonreducibile subgroups above, other subgroups are cells which belong to formal
type groups and cells which belong to informal type groups. Thus there exist
different time periods during which such subgroups exist due to different nature
of these subgroups. There are different time periods characteristic for the group
of agents on the capital market due to different time to perform different tasks.
We assume that processes in the group of agents on capital market are of the
relaxation type. There are such reasons for the induced fluctuation from the
equilibrium (or metastable) state as events in economy and on the market. We
assume that these events do not change the equilibrium (or metastable) state.
Thus the group of agents has social behaviour for which some of the events in
economy and on the market lead to a fluctuation around the minimum state, we
assume that this fluctuation is a perturbation of the market of the short time
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nature at some time t = 0. The equation of motion for the agent average num-
ber < n > per nonreducibile subgroup is found, and is of the relaxation type.
We further assume that the average number < n > of agents per nonreducibile
subgroup is perturbed from the equilibrium state < n > . The fluctuation from
this state is δ < n >. The perturbation δ < n > (t), which has at the time t = 0
value δ < n >0, is evolving to zero after some time. We study characteristics of
this evolution when the extreme of the aim function is maximum and when this
extreme is minimum. We then consider two limiting cases, when the aversion
constant A0 is near to 2b from below, A0 → 2b, and when the aversion constant
A0 tends to zero, A0 → 0. In the first case we find the relaxation constant τ to
the lowest order in (A0 − 2b). When the expected volatility EV increases the
relaxation constant τ in this limit decreases. When the expected volatility EV
decreases the relaxation constant τ in this limit increases. When the aversion
constant A0 tends to 2b, e.i. when it increases in this limit, the relaxation con-
stant τ decreases to zero in the fourth order in (A0−2b) . The constant (A0−4b)
is called in our paper as the contribution to the total aversion constant from
the crowd. It increases when the aversion constant A0 tends to 2b. Increasing
the aversion constant A0 leads to larger acceptance of the crowd of expected
risk, and thus of expected return. Verification of information with its decreasing
intensity in this limit leads to slower return back to the equilibrium state. The
expected return in this limit and in the first term of the expansion in small
parameter is not present in the expression for the relaxation constant τ . We
obtain also the relaxation constant τ to the lowest order in (A0 tending to zero.
When the aversion constant A0 tends to 0, e.i. when it decreases, the relaxation
constant τ remains finite. When the expected volatility EV increases the relax-
ation constant τ in this limit increases. The state with the fluctuation at time
t = 0 returns back to the minimum less quickly. When the expected volatility
EV decreases the relaxation constant τ in this limit decreases. The state with
the fluctuation at time t = 0 returns back to the minimum more quickly. The
larger expected return, the smaller the relaxation constant and the return to
the equilibrium is again more quickly. The larger expected volatility, the larger
the relaxation constant and the return to the equilibrium is more slowly. The
smaller expected return, the larger the relaxation constant and the return to
the equilibrium is more slowly. The larger the intensity b of verification of in-
formation the smaller the relaxation constant τ . The state with a fluctuation
at time t = 0 returns back to the equilibrium state more quickly. The smaller
the intensity b of verification of information the larger the relaxation constant
τ . The state with fluctuation returns back to the equilibrium state more slowly.
Decreasing the aversion constant A0 leads to smaller acceptance of the expected
risk, and thus of the expected return. The equation of motion leads in the sec-
ond case of minimum to the linear in time damping to the equilibrium state
with the characteristic time T3, and T6. For A0 > 2b the characteristic constant
Vc6 < 0 is negative. The characteristic time T6 increases with decrease of risk
EV, with decrease of profits, and with decrease of the risk constant A0 toward
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4b . This increase is however to a finite value. For A0 < 2b the characteristic
constant Vc6 > 0 is positive. The characteristic time T6 increases with decrease
of risk EV to the Vc6 value or with increase of risk EV to the Vc6 value. The
increase of the characteristic time T6 is now large. The characteristic constant
Vc3 is defined as Vc3 = 2A0E
A0−2b
A0−4b
. With decrease of risk EV toward Vc3 the
characteristic time T3 increases to large values.
2 Social Behaviour of Agents: Capital Markets
We know [5] that personal diameter r increases when F, the measure of ver-
ification of information, decreases. We generalized this relation to every cell:
assuming that the personal diameter r increases when < f >, the average num-
ber of nonreducIbile groups per cell, decreases. In the topological structure
< f > is an average number of faces per cell. Thus generalized quantity < f >
is also the quantity which characterizes verification of information. Aversion
of an agent to risk on capital markets contains [6] a contribution proportional
to the verification of information. We assume that the number of nonreducible
subgroups F per cell, < f >, contributes linearly to this aversion constant A:
A = A0 − 4.b+ < f > .b. (1)
A0 is the risk aversion constant for < f >= 4, then A = A0. b is a constant
which characterizes contribution of the quantity < f > to the risk aversion,
it is an intensity of contribution of verification of information to the aversion
constant. Note that the larger quantity < f > the better verification of in-
formation, the larger expected return contribution of the investment and thus
the larger acceptable risk. The pyramidal (hierarchical) structure appears in
the group when < f >= 4, then A = A0, [6]. Such a type of structure corre-
sponds to hierarchical economy systems [7]. Due to very low risk price signals
do not work in these systems. Information is flowing through the hierarchy to
the decision makers in such structure, however we do not consider the direc-
tion of flow of interaction between agents in [5] and [6]. When the structure
contains topologically only one cell then < n >= 6 and A tends to infinity. Bet-
ter verification of information leads to expectation of higher returns and thus
the acceptable expected risk is larger. Such a type of structure corresponds to
market-based economy systems [7]. Price signals are essential in these systems.
We interpreted (< f > .b) as an average measure of risk aversion of a personal
(individual) contribution to the risk aversion. It is different from the crowd con-
tribution of a person in the group, because < f > is a characteristic quantity
of verification of information. Agents supply or demand goods and services (on
the capital market shares or bonds) if the market price of goods and services
exceeds or undervalues his/her own valuation of goods and services (shares or
bonds). To make own valuation of shares or bonds the agent individually ver-
ifies information about them. In practice, [7], both types of economy system
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involve interaction of people: in the market system they interact as traders, in
the hierarchy system as agents within a hierarchy organization. Both market-
and hierarchy- based systems co-exist in modern economy [7].
In market economies intermediation process is understood quite well in a
hypothetical market economy by considering how it might function without
financial intermediaries [8]. In our model of capital markets [6] every point
(vertex) corresponds to an agent acting on the market. In the simplified model
economy described in [8] these agents would be households. Financial interme-
diaries which lead to lower costs were described in our model [6] as cell with
a given risk aversion constant of the firm to which risk aversion constants of
agents from this firm - cell should not be too far. Some other cells are cells
with zero risk tolerance constant, agents in these cells correspond to individual
savers - agents. We assume that every agent has its objective to maximize its
expected utility of wealth [9]. If returns are normally distributed and the in-
vestor has constant absolute risk aversion, then expected utility can be written
in an exponential form [10]. Let us denote by A the aversion constant which
when increasing will prefer E, the expected value of end-of-period wealth. EV,
the expected variance of end-of-period wealth has then increasing acceptable
value. The expected utility of an agent is found as large as possible by the
maximization procedure, [11], assuming that the risk aversion is constant. In
our model [6] we assume that every agent has the same E (the expected value of
end-of-period wealth) and the same EV (the expected variance of end-of-period
wealth). We considered in [6] not only maximization of expected utility of an
agent, but also optimization of interactions of agents in such a way in which
interacting agents maximize their expected utility. Optimization of the corre-
sponding aim function for given E and EV leads to optimization of the number
of agents in the cell and to optimization of verification of information which is
characterized by < f >. Then structure of exchange of information in the group
of agents will be such that we obtain the highest value of the aim function fM,
[6].
The mix of investment of a single cell in the mean field approximation is
found from the function:
< FM >= (−c.EB +
c2
2
EVB)
< f > . < n >
3
+ γBc
2
B
< f > . < n >
3
, (2)
where EB = E + 2γcB is expected return for a given investment period
modified by contribution of the return from the cell (firm) financial intermediary,
EVB = EV + 2γ is expected risk for a given investment period modified by
contribution of the risk from the cell (firm) financial intermediary, E and EV is
expected return and risk respectively for a given investment period. Here cB is
a risk constant given for the cell. Note that c = 1
A
. We study the case γ = 0,
which does not distinguish between individual investors (for which γ = 0 ) and
a financial intermediary firm (for which γ > 0) .
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Thus the equation for the aim function FM is found from (2):
< FM >= (−c.E +
c2
2
EV )
< f > . < n >
3
, (3)
here <f>.<n>3 is an average number of agents per cell. From (1) and (3) we
find:
< FM >= (−
E
A0 − 4.b+ < f > .b
+
EV
2.(A0 − 4.b+ < f > .b)2
)
< f > . < n >
3
(4)
For an equilibrium structure with a given number of cells C, of faces F, of
interactions E, and of agents V, see [3] and [4], the relation holds:
< f >=
12
(6− < n >)
, (5)
We use A1 = A0 − 4.b. From the aim function FM (4) we have found
number of cell C, of faces F and of interactions E which minimizes it, in the
mean field approximation. The number of agents V is given. It means that
there is a minimization of FM with respect to < n >, number of interaction in
an nonreducibile subgroup e.i. with respect to < f >. We have found [6] such
a structure of agents on the capital market which gives the lowest value of the
aim function FM taking into account their interaction exchanging information.
The function FM has extremes. An absolute minimum corresponds to such
a state in which there is an optimal mix, there is an equilibrium state of the
market. There exists an extreme of FM, < n >′, which is given by [6]:
< n >′= 6.
(EV (A0 − 2b)− 2E(A0 − 2b)
2)
(EV.A0 − 2E(A0 − 4b)(A0 − 2b))
. (6)
The extreme may be an absolute minimum for A0 < 2b. This is the case
when the tendency to verify information is stronger with respect to the aversion
constant A0. The extreme (6) is minimum if the inequalities hold:
2E(2b−A0) > EV > E
A0
b
(2b−A0) (7)
Here the state with < n >= 6 has lower value of the aim function than the
state < n >= 3.
The extreme is also minimum if the inequality:
E
A0
b
(2b−A0) > EV ≥ 0, (8)
holds. Here the state with < n >= 3 has now lower value of the aim function
than the state < n >= 6.
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In both these cases the extreme is a state in which some type of hierarchical
structures exists. Either locally, the group is not hierarchical as a whole, in
the first case, or it is of the hierarchical structure type in the second case. The
minimum gives the average number of agents per nonreducibie subgroup which
is less than 6 and larger than 3, in the first case, and is equal to 3 in the second
case.
The extreme (6) is also minimum if:
EV > 2E(2b−A0). (9)
Here the state with < n >= 6 is minimum. In this case the minimum of the
aim function with < n >= 6 is a state in which there is no type of hierarchical
structure present in the group.
The extreme may be an absolute maximum for A0 > 2b. In this case the
state < n >= 6 has always lower value of the aim function than the state with
< n >= 3.
The extreme (6) is maximum if, for A0 > 4b, the inequality holds:
EV > 2E
A0(A0 − 2b)
A0 − 4b
(10)
There exist two states which minimize the aim function FM. The first one
is with < n >= 3 (hierarchical) structure.
The second one is for < n >= 6. The value of the aim function FM is such
that this state is much more stable than the state above with < n >= 3, which
is a metastable state. The number < n >= 6 means that there is a one cell
structure. Efficient capital markets are ideal markets which are of the this type
(strong stability, conservative and aggressive agents are present on the market,
return is high) in our model.
The extreme (6) is maximum if, for A0 > 4b, inequalities hold:
2E
A0(A0 − 2b)
A0 − 4b
> EV > 2E
(A0 − 4b)(A0 − 2b)
A0
(11)
There exists one state which minimizes function FM for 3 ≤< n >≤ 6. The
state with < n >= 3, which was a metastable state, is now not the metastable
state. The minimum of the aim function FM is for < n >= 6.
The extreme (6) is maximum if, for 4b > A0 > 2b, the inequality holds:
EV < 2E
A0(A0 − 2b)
A0 − 4b
(12)
There exist two states which minimize function FM. The first one is with
< n >= 3 and the second one is with < n >= 6. This later state has the value
of the aim function FM such that this state is much more stable than the state
corresponding to < n >= 3 which is a metastable state.
The extreme (6) is maximum if, for 4b > A0 > 2b, the inequality holds:
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EV > 2E
A0(A0 − 2b)
A0 − 4b
(13)
The state with < n >= 6 is now a state corresponding to the minimum of
the aim function. There is no metastable state.
3 Volatility of the Market, Aversion Constant
and Equilibrium State
Let us discuss the relations between the volatility of the market, the aversion
constant and the equilibrium state. When the constant b of verification of
information contribution to the risk constant A is such that A0 > 4b, than
for the volatility EV of the price return on the capital market higher that the
characteristic constant Vc3, e.i. for EV > Vc3, there is an extreme as maximum
present for < n >. The state < n >= 3, has always higher value of the
aim function than the state < n >= 6. The characteristic constant Vc3 is
defined as Vc3 =
−A0Vc6
−A1
. Here the characteristic constant Vc6 is defined as
Vc6 = −2E(A0 − 2b). It depends on the expected return E. The characteristic
constant Vc3 can be rewritten as Vc3 =
2A0E(A0−2b)
−A1
= 2A0E(A0−2b)
−(A0−4b)
. For A0 > 4b
the characteristic constant Vc6 < 0. For 0 ≤ EV ≤ Vc3 there is a maximum at
< n >= 3. The < n >= 6 state is the minimum state.
When the constant b of verification of information contribution to the risk
constant A is such that 2b < A0 < 4b, than for the volatility EV, which is always
positive EV > 0 (only in the economy with fixed prices the expected volatility
is zero EV = 0 ) the state < n >= 6 is always the minimum state. The state
< n >= 3 is a maximum. The characteristic constant Vc3 and the characteristic
constant Vc6 are negative in this case.
When the constant b of verification of information contribution to the risk
constant A is such that 0 ≤ A0 ≤ 2b, then we find that two characteristic
constants Vc3 and Vc6 obey the inequalities 0 ≤ Vc3 ≤ Vc6. We must distinguish
then several cases. The 0 ≤ Vc3 ≤ Vc6 ≤ EV case is such that the state
< n >= 6 is the minimum state. The state < n >= 3 is the maximum state.
The 0 ≤ Vc3 ≤ EV ≤ Vc6 case is such that the state 3 << n >< 6 is the
minimum state, it minimizes the aim function. The state < n >= 3 is the
maximum state, and also the state < n >= 6 is the maximum state. Depending
on whether EV ≤ Vcm or whether Vcm ≤ EV the state < n >= 6 is higher
than the state < n >= 3, and the state < n >= 3 would be higher than the
state < n >= 6, respectively. Here Vcm is an constant defined as Vcm =
A0Vc6
2b .
The 0 ≤ EV ≤ Vc3 ≤ Vc6 case is such that the state < n >= 3 is minimum, the
state < n >= 6 is maximum.
We assumed in this paper and in our previous work [6] that profits are
positive. The case of negative profits does not correspond to a capital markets
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on which there is proportional relation between the risk and the positive profit.
Here we consider longer term relations.
4 Relaxation Behaviour of Agents on the Capi-
tal Market
Relaxation behaviour is observed in many social groups. Let us consider ar-
bitrage processes for the group of agents on the capital market. Arbitrage is
a way to earn guaranteed profits without investing money [7]. The law of one
price says that the same good cannot sell at two different prices on the market.
Arbitrage opportunities violate this law. If two assets have identical payoffs
and different prices on the market then this fluctuation of the market will not
sustained as an equilibrium state [12]. A profit without risk will not be earned
for long time: the buyers and sellers will drive the prices together by trad-
ing. Group norms create a force toward behavioural regularities [13]. Thus this
driving price process is a behavioural regularity. Group cohesiveness creates a
force toward behavioural uniformity [13]. Thus arbitrage trades and mentioned
forces lead the group into the equilibrium state. We will consider the relaxation
process, which after perturbing the group of agents on the market for example
by an arbitrage opportunity to the market state with fluctuation, will lead to
the equilibrium state.
One of the organizational behaviour characteristics and aims is productivity
[13]. Productivity is a performance measure including effectiveness and effi-
ciency. Effectiveness of the organizational behaviour is achievements of goals.
Efficiency of the organizational behaviour is the ratio of effective output to the
input required to achieve it. An organization is productive when it achieves its
goals and does so by transferring inputs into outputs with the lowest cost. A
group of agents on the capital market is a part of an organization. We consider
here agents interacting together exchanging information for given conditions on
the capital market. The behaviour of agents in the general group is more than
the sum of individual actings in his or her own way. The agents in the group
behave in an other way than when they are alone. To understand dynamics of
behaviour of the group of agents one should know how an individual, an agent
in the group, is influenced by the pattern behaviour he/she is expected to ex-
hibit, what the group considers to be acceptable standard of behaviour, and
the degree to which group members are attracted to each other. Organizational
system behaviour reaches its highest level of sophistication, [13], when we add
formal structure to knowledge of individual and group behaviour. Organization
is more that the sum of their member groups. We study here behaviour of the
group of agents on the capital market as mentioned above. The other groups
interacting with this group are not studied here directly. This group consists of
nonreducibile subgroups [6]. nonreducibile subgroups are also groups with their
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properties. A group is in general formed by two or more individuals, interacting
and interdependent, who have come together to achieve some goals. The group
of agents on the capital market may have two members, a buyer and a seller.
This would be a very elementary case of a market. Real markets contain many
agents acting on them. We will assume that there is a large number of agents
in the group of agents on the capital market. A group may be formal or infor-
mal, [13]. Formal groups are defined by the organizational structure. Informal
groups are alliances that are neither formally structured nor organizationally
determined. These groups are naturally created groups in the environment that
appear in response to the need for social contacts [13]. In the group of agents on
the capital market there are formal groups (financial institutions, firms, other
institutions) and informal groups allianced in response to the need for social
contact concerning the capital market (agents as individual investors, agents as
members of financial institutions, agents as members of firms, agents as members
of other institutions, all of them forming also informal groups). There exist in
general such groups as command, task, interest, or friendship groups. The last
type of the group develops because the individual members have some common
characteristics. Social aliances, which may extend outside the work situation,
can be based on such common characteristics as is interest about development
on the capital market, about development of the price of a share, about develop-
ment of a firm projects, etc. Thus interactions of agents described by topology
in our papers are interactions of agents in formal and informal groups. Agents
belong to a number of groups in general. Different groups provide different
benefits to their members. Agents are joining into groups due to such reasons
as needs for security, status, self-esteem, affiliation, power and goal achieve-
ment [13]. This is true in general and this is true also for agents on the capital
market. There is no standardized way how a group develops. The Five-Stage
Model and the Punctuated-Equilibrium Model are some models describing this
development, [13]. In the group of agents on the capital market such groups
as its subgroups are forming. We mentioned nonreducibile subgroups above,
other subgroups are cells which belong to formal type groups and cells which
belong to informal type groups. Thus there exist different time periods during
which such subgroups exist due different nature of these subgroups. Some of the
groups may be more successful some of them less. It depends on several vari-
ables. Major components that determine a group performance and satisfaction
are, [13], external conditions imposed on the group, group member resources,
group structure, the group process-performance/satisfaction relationship is de-
pendent on the task which the group is working on. These group properties
and characteristics hold also for subgroups in the group of agents on capital
market. Within a group there are processes such as the communication pattern
used by its members to exchange information, group decision processes, leader
behaviour, power dynamics, conflict interactions etc [13]. The task uncertainty
has the property that nonroutine tasks require considerably more processing of
information. Tasks with low uncertainty tend to be standardized. The groups
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performing first type of the task need to interact with other groups to obtain
more and better information. The groups performing the tasks of the second
type do not need to interact with other groups so much. Performing task means
that after some time this task will be fulfilled.
As we can see there are different time periods characteristic for the group
of agents on the capital market due to different time to perform different tasks.
While there may be present some oscillation type processes of exchange of infor-
mation between groups, relaxation of this interaction is expected when the task
is fulfilled. Exchange of information within a group may be more oscillatory
than for the intergroup case, nevertheless when the task is fulfilled, these inter-
actions will also relax to zero. There are many subgroups in the group of agents
on the capital market ending their task in different times. We will assume that
processes in the group of agents on capital market are of the relaxation type.
5 Equation of Motion for the Agent Average
Number
The social group of buyers and sellers is such that its state corresponds to the
absolute minimum of the aim function. The social group of buyers and sellers
may be in such a state which corresponds to a metastable minimum of the aim
function. Due to many reasons the group may shift from the state corresponding
to a minimu of the aim function to a very near state. There are such reasons for
the induced fluctuation from the equilibrium (or metastable) state as events in
economy and on the market. Arbitrage process is of this type. We will assume
that these events do not change the equilibrium (or metastable) state. Thus the
group of agents has social behaviour for which some of the events in economy
and on the market lead to a fluctuation around the minimum state, we assume
that this fluctuation is a perturbation of the market of the short time nature
at some time t = 0. We would like to know how the social behaviour of agents
return back to the equilibrium (or metastable) minimum state. Thus type of
events which may lead to change of the minimum state to other minimum state
is not considered in this paper. Also large amplitude perturbations which after
some time vanishes are not considered here.
The equation of motion for the agent average number < n > per nonre-
ducibile subgroup is in this case assumed, as we discussed, of the relaxation
type:
∂
∂t
δ < n >= −λ
δ < FM > (< n > + δ < n >)
δδ < n >
(14)
Here we assume that the average number < n > of agents per nonreducibile
subgroup is perturbed from the equilibrium state < n > . The fluctuation from
this state is δ < n >. Time t is in general in the interval 0 ≤ t ≤ ∞. The
perturbation δ < n > (t), which has at the time t = 0 value δ < n >0, is
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evolving to zero after some time. We will study characteristics of this evolution
when the extreme of the aim function is maximum and when this extreme is
minimum. In the first case we have found the minimum at < n > = 3 and at
< n > = 6. In the second case the minimum is such that 3 << n > < 6, other
minimum is at < n > = 3, or at < n > = 6
6 Development of the Group of Agents: The
Extreme is Minimum
When the extreme (6) is minimum, then the state 3 << n >< 6 or the state with
< n >= 3 which has lower value of the aim function than the state < n >= 6
or the state with < n >= 6 which has lower value of the aim function than the
state < n >= 3 , are equilibrium states. The equation of motion leads in the
first case to the exponential damping of the fluctuation to the equilibrium state
with the relaxation time τ :
δ < n >= δ < n >0 exp(−
t
τ
) (15)
here δ < n >0 is a fluctuation of the state at time zero , and where:
τ =
144(EV b)2(A0 − 2b)
λ(EV.A0 − 2E(A0 − 2b)(A0 − 4b))2
.S (16)
and where the quantity S is defined as:
S = −(EV+2E(A0−4b))+
(A0 − 4b)
2
192EV.b2(A0 − 2b)2
[96b(A0−2b)(−EV
2+2E2(A0−2b)
2)
(17)
+(EV.A0 − 2E(A0 − 2b)(A0 − 4b))
2] +
E(A2
0
−(4b)2)
2b
Let us consider two limiting cases, when the aversion constant A0, is near
to 2b from below, A0 → 2b, and when the aversion constant A0 tends to zero,
A0 → 0.
In the first case we obtain that the relaxation constant τ is, to the lowest
order in (A0 − 2b), given by:
τ =
486b2(A0 − 2b)
4
λ.EV.A40
(18)
When the expected volatility EV increases the relaxation constant τ in this
limit decreases. The state with the fluctuation at time t = 0 returns back to
the minimum more quickly. When the expected volatility EV decreases the
relaxation constant τ in this limit increases. The state with the fluctuation at
time t = 0 returns back to the minimum less quickly. The expected volatility
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EV influences how quickly the state with fluctuation returns back to the equi-
librium state. When the aversion constant A0 tends to 2b, e.i. when it increases
in this limit, the relaxation constant τ decreases to zero in the fourth order in
(A0 − 2b) . The constant (A0 − 4b) is called in our paper as the contribution
to the total aversion constant from the crowd. It increases when the aversion
constant A0 tends to 2b. The state with fluctuation decreases more quickly to
the equilibrium state. The ability of the crowd to remain self-aware and think
logically is suppressed [1]. Increasing the aversion constant A0 leads to larger
acceptance of the crowd of expected risk, and thus of expected return. When
the intensity of personal contribution to the aversion constant, b, decreases in
this limit,then the relaxation constant τ firstly increases, and then for b < A06
decreases. This later inequality is however such that the expansion in small
parameter A0 − 2b ∝
2A0
3 is not valid in general. Thus verification of informa-
tion with its decreasing intensity in this limit leads slower return back to the
equilibrium state. Note that the expected return in this limit and in the first
term of the expansion in small parameter is not present in the expression for
the relaxation constant τ .
In the second case we obtain that the relaxation constant τ is, to the lowest
order in A0, given by:
τ =
27.EV 3
32λE4b2
(19)
When the expected volatility EV increases now the relaxation constant τ in
this limit increases. The state with the fluctuation at time t = 0 returns back to
the minimum less quickly. When the expected volatility EV decreases the relax-
ation constant τ in this limit decreases. The state with the fluctuation at time
t = 0 returns back to the minimum more quickly. The expected volatility EV
influences how quickly the state with fluctuation returns back to the equilibrium
state also in this case. When the aversion constant A0 tends to 0, e.i. when it
decreases, the relaxation constant τ remains finite. The constant (A0 − 4b),the
contribution to the total aversion constant from the crowd, becomes larger in
amplitude and negative. The crowd behaves more irrationally. As we mentioned
above the smaller expected volatility, the smaller the relaxation constant and
the return to the equilibrium is more quickly. And the larger expected return,
the smaller the relaxation constant and the return to the equilibrium is again
more quickly. The larger expected volatility, the larger the relaxation constant
and the return to the equilibrium is more slowly. The smaller expected return,
the larger the relaxation constant and the return to the equilibrium is more
slowly. The ability of the crowd to remain self-aware and think logically is sup-
pressed [1] as we mentioned. The dominance of the crowds belief system limits
severe quality of data which crowd recognizes as information [1]. The larger
the intensity b of verification of information the smaller the relaxation constant
τ . The state with a fluctuation at time t = 0 returns back to the equilibrium
state more quickly. The smaller the intensity b of verification of information
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the larger the relaxation constant τ . The state with fluctuation returns back to
the equilibrium state more slowly. Decreasing the aversion constant A0 leads to
smaller acceptance of the expected risk, and thus of the expected return.
The equation of motion leads in the second case of minimum to the linear
in time damping to the equilibrium state with: the characteristic time T3:
δ < n >= δ < n >0 (1−
t
T3
) (20)
where:
T3 =
| δ < n >0| 3A
2
0
λ | (EV − Vc3)(A0 − 4b) |
(21)
Here δ < n >0 is again a fluctuation of the state at time zero.
When the state < n >= 6 is an equilibrium state, the equation of motion
lead in this case to the linear in time damping with the characteristic time T6:
δ < n >= δ < n >0 (1−
t
T6
) (22)
where:
T6 =
| δ < n >0| 12δ
2
λ | Vc6 − EV |
(23)
Discussion of dependencies of characteristic times T3 and T6 are formally the
same as in the case when the extreme is maximum, see below.
7 Development of the Group of Agents: The
Extreme is Maximum
When the extreme (6) is maximum, then the state << n >= 6 or the state with
< n >= 3 are the states corresponding to minimum of the aim function. In this
case the state < n >= 6 has always lower value of the aim function than the
state with < n >= 3. Thus the state < n >= 6 is an equilibrium state, the state
with < n >= 3 is a metastable state. As discussed above the state < n >= 6
has always lower value of the aim function than the state with < n >= 3. In
the case discussed above the state < n >= 6 is an equilibrium state, and the
state with < n >= 3 is not a metastable state, it is a maximum.
The equation of motion lead in the first case to the linear in time damping
with the characteristic time T6:
δ < n >= δ < n >0 (1−
t
T6
) (24)
where:
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T6 =
| δ < n >0| 12δ
2
λ | Vc6 − EV |
(25)
Here δ < n >0 is again a fluctuation of the state at time zero. For A0 > 2b
the characteristic constant Vc6 < 0 is negative. The characteristic time T6
increases with decrease of risk EV, with decrease of profits, and with decrease
of the risk constant A0 toward 4b . This increase is however to a finite value.
For A0 < 2b the characteristic constant Vc6 > 0 is positive. The characteristic
time T6 increases with decrease of risk EV to the Vc6 value or with increase of
risk EV to the Vc6 value. The increase of the characteristic time T6 is now large.
The equation of motion leads in case of the metastable state case < n >=
3 also to the linear in time damping to the locally minimum state with the
characteristic time T3:
δ < n >= δ < n >0 (1−
t
T3
) (26)
where:
T3 =
| δ < n >0| 3A
2
0
λ | (EV − Vc3)(A0 − 4b) |
(27)
Here δ < n >0 is again a fluctuation of the state at time zero. The charac-
teristic constant Vc3 = 2A0E
A0−2b
A0−4b
. With decrease of risk EV toward Vc3 the
characteristic time T3 increases to large values,
The state < n >= 6 has always lower value of the aim function than the
state with < n >= 3. In the case discussed above when the state < n >= 6 is
an equilibrium state, and the state with < n >= 3 is not a metastable state,
the characteristic time T6 discussion above is the same. There is no linear in
time damping to the state < n >= 3, it is a maximum.
8 Conclusions
We studied capital market and social behaviour of agents. Quantity F, and in
general < f >, is the quantity which characterizes verification of information
and thus contributes to aversion of an agent with respect to a risk. We gener-
alized this relation to every cell: we assumed that personal diameter r increases
when < f >, the average number of nonreducibile groups per cell, decreases,
< f > is an average number of faces per cell. Aversion of an agent to risk
on capital markets also contains characterization of verification of information.
We assumed that the number of nonreducible subgroups F per cell, < f >,
contributes linearly to this aversion constant A.
When the pyramidal structure appears in the group, < f >= 4, then A =
A0. This type of structure corresponds to hierarchical economy systems. When
the structure contains topologically only one cell then < n >= 6 and A tends to
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infinity. Better verification of information leads to expectation of higher returns
and thus the acceptable risk is larger. This type of structure corresponds to
market-based economy systems. They work via price signals. We interpret
A0−4.b as a kind of measure of risk aversion of crowd and we interpret (< f > .b)
as an average measure of risk aversion of a personal /individual/ contribution
to risk aversion different from the crowd contribution of this person in the cell.
In practice both types of system involve interaction of people: in the market
system they interact as traders, in the hierarchy as agents within an organiza-
tion. Both market- and hierarchy- based systems co-exist in modern economy:
we have open markets and we also have large organizations. This coresponds
to our state which is minimum for 3 << n >< 6. In our model the market-
based system corresponds to a state with < n >= 6 and the hierarchy-based to
< n >= 3.
The mix of investments of an agent in a given cell with an average measure
A of risk aversion in the cell is found from extremes of the function FM, the aim
function. We find the minimum of the average /per cell/ function < FM >.
We assume that in our model the individual investors and agents from financial
intermediary firms do not differ. More general case will studied elsewhere.
When < f >= 4 then the pyramidal (hierarchical) structure exists in which
there are only nonreducibie subgroups with n = 3. Thus we consider this struc-
ture as a structure with a uniform risk aversion constant A0. Then a personal
contributions to the risk aversion constant of an agent are those contributions
which are corresponding to structures with < n >> 3. Thus there is a linear
contribution to the risk aversion constant which is proportional to < f > −4.
This corresponds to nonuniform risk aversion constants in the structure. This
contains a personal contribution to the risk aversion constant. We use <f>.<n>3
as an average number of agents per cell.
The extreme of < FM > is minimum for some conditions on the market,
and in the group of agents, see above. This minimum corresponds to < n >
between 3 to 6. This is a stable state. The extreme may be a maximum. Then
there are two minima of the function FM, one of them is that which corresponds
to < n >= 3 (the pyramidal hierarchical structure) which is a metastable state,
and the other one corresponds to < n >= 6 (the structure with hexagons in
average and with one cell) which is a stable state. Efficient capital markets
are markets which are of the second type (strong stability, conservative and
aggressive agents are present on the market, returns are high). Aboav’s law
describes how many, m(f, n), agents are present in average in nonreducibie
subgroups in a cell neighbouring to a cell with f nonredducibile subgroups with
agent average number n. This enables us to characterize variance of n for the
distribution of nonreducibile subgroups. This variance diverges to infinity with
< n > tending to 6.
The financial intermediaries play a key role to reduce the risks faced by in-
dividual savers, by pooling their savings and using these to assemble diversified
portfolios of assets. This diversification requires specialized knowledge and ex-
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pertise, and a large portfolio. This will studied using our model with nonzero γ
constant coresponding to a firm with a given tolerance risk constant.
The aim of this paper was to study social behaviour of agents on capital
markets when these are perturbed. We studied small perturbations of the mar-
ket using mean field method. Social behaviour of agents on capital markets was
described firstly. Model and results of its study, which were done recently by
the author [5] and [6], for this behaviour were shortly discussed for reference
purposes. Volatility of the market, aversion constant and equilibrium states are
discussed then in the next section. Relaxation behaviour of agents on the cap-
ital market in the fourth section is studied. Equation of motion for the agent
average number is of the relaxational type, and is described in the next section.
The oscillation type of motion is not considered here. Development of the group
of agents in the states corresponding to minimum of the aim function is linear
and exponentially damped for the case when the the extreme of the aim func-
tion is minimum and is maximum. This development was studied in the sixth
section.
We conclude that there exist characteristic volatility constants Vc3 and Vc3.
The constant b of verification of information contribution to the risk constant A
and the A0 constant of aversion are distinguishing three types of dependencies
of the minimum of the aim function on the expected volatility EV and on the
expected returns E. These are A0 > 4b, 2b < A0 < 4b and A0 < 2b. The
minimum in 3 << n >< 6. in < n >= 3 and in < n >= 6 is found. Thus
estimating the average values of the aversion constant A0 and of the constant
b of the intensity of the verification of information we should distinguish which
type of dependence of the equilibrium market state occurs. The other groups
interacting with the group of agents on the capital market are not studied here
directly. Their inclusion would lead to study of the intergroup interactions.
On the capital market subgroups are forming. We mentioned nonreducibile
subgroups above, other subgroups are cells which belong to formal type groups
and cells which belong to informal type groups. We assume that processes in
the group of agents on capital market are of the relaxation type. There are
such reasons for the induced fluctuation from the equilibrium (or metastable)
state as events in economy and on the market. We assume that these events do
not change the equilibrium (or metastable) state. Thus the group of agents has
social behaviour for which some of the events in economy and on the market
lead to a fluctuation around the minimum state, we assume that this fluctuation
is of a perturbation of the market of the short time nature at some time t = 0.
The equation of motion for the agent average number < n > per nonreducibile
subgroup is found, and is of the relaxation type. We studied characteristics of
evolution of perturbation on the market when the extreme of the aim function is
maximum and when this extreme is minimum. We consider two limiting cases,
when the aversion constant A0, is near to 2b from below, A0 → 2b, and when
the aversion constant A0 tends to zero, A0 → 0. In the first case we obtain
that the relaxation constant τ is, to the lowest order in A0 − 2b). When the
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expected volatility EV increases the relaxation constant τ in this limit decreases.
When the expected volatility EV decreases the relaxation constant τ in this limit
increases. When the aversion constant A0 tends to 2b, e.i. when it increases
in this limit, the relaxation constant τ decreases to zero in the fourth order in
(A0−2b) . The constant (A0−4b) is called in our paper as the contribution to the
total aversion constant from the crowd. It increases when the aversion constant
A0 tends to 2b. Increasing the aversion constant A0 leads to larger acceptance
of the crowd of expected risk, and thus of expected return. Verification of
information with its decreasing intensity in this limit leads slower return back
to the equilibrium state. The expected return in this limit and in the first
term of the expansion in small parameter is not present in the expression for
the relaxation constant τ . We obtain the relaxation constant τ to the lowest
order in (A0 tending to zero. When the expected volatility EV increases now
the relaxation constant τ in this limit increases. The state with the fluctuation
at time t = 0 returns back to the minimum less quickly. When the expected
volatility EV decreases the relaxation constant τ in this limit decreases. The
state with the fluctuation at time t = 0 returns back to the minimum more
quickly. When the aversion constant A0 tends to 0, e.i. when it decreases, the
relaxation constant τ remains finite. The larger expected return, the smaller
the relaxation constant and the return to the equilibrium is again more quickly.
The larger expected volatility, the larger the relaxation constant and the return
to the equilibrium is more slowly. The smaller expected return, the larger the
relaxation constant and the return to the equilibrium is more slowly. The larger
the intensity b of verification of information the smaller the relaxation constant
τ . The state with a fluctuation at time t = 0 returns back to the equilibrium
state more quickly. The smaller the intensity b of verification of information
the larger the relaxation constant τ . The state with fluctuation returns back to
the equilibrium state more slowly. Decreasing the aversion constant A0 leads
to smaller acceptance of the expected risk, and thus of the expected return.
The equation of motion leads in the second case of minimum to the linear in
time damping to the equilibrium state with the characteristic time T3 and T6.
For A0 > 2b the characteristic constant Vc6 < 0 is negative. The characteristic
time T6 increases with decrease of risk EV, with decrease of profits, and with
decrease of the risk constant A0 toward 4b . This increase is however to a
finite value. For A0 < 2b the characteristic constant Vc6 > 0 is positive. The
characteristic time T6 increases with decrease of risk EV to the Vc6 value or
with increase of risk EV to the Vc6 value. The increase of the characteristic
time T6 is now large. The characteristic constant Vc3 = 2A0E
A0−2b
A0−4b
. With
decrease of risk EV toward Vc3 the characteristic time T3 increases to large
values, Our model thus, under defined conditions describes development on the
market, when small perturbations are present. The developed capital markets
are different from emerging capital markets, [14]. It is interesting, that we
have found and exponentially damped behaviour of the index on the Bratislava
Stock Exchange and Prague Stock Exchange, [15], when the trading started
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on these markets after coupon privatization ended. The prices of the most
liquid shares were in that moment still not in equilibrium, they developed after
several months to an equilibrium state. It is well known property of prices (of
commodities physical and financial) that when after increase of the price due to
some perturbation these prices return back to the equilibrium price more slowly
than when after decrease of the price of the commodity due to some perturbation
these prices return back to the equilibrium price. Thus the relaxation constant
of the first return back is larger than of the second one. While the expected
price is in both cases the same, we can say within our model, assuming that we
are in the limit of low A0, that the expected volatility is lower in the second
case than in the first second one. The quantitative and qualitative dependencies
described above may be thus compared with those observed on real markets.
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